Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space by Huntley, Wade L. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2005-10
Planning the unplannable: Scenarios on




Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
+ MODELSpace Policy xx (2009) 1e14
www.elsevier.com/locate/spacepolPlanning the unplannable: Scenarios on the future of space*
Wade L. Huntley a,*, Joseph G. Bock b, Miranda Weingartner c
a US Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, USA
b Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, Notre Dame, IN, USA
c Weingartner Consulting, Ontario, CanadaAbstractThis article explores the use of scenario analysis as a methodology to rigorously analyze potential space futures, particularly with respect to
space security challenges, in the context of rapid and uncertain change across several dimensions of human space activities. The successful use
of scenario analysis in other (e.g. corporate and military) sectors is described and results of an initial scenario analysis workshop are presented.
Scenario analysis is recommended as a promising approach to evaluating the long-term consequences of various policy choices in the context of
uncertainty, and as a process well-suited to fostering communication and building consensual knowledge among diverse stakeholders.
 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The future of the human presence in space has many faces.1
The uses of satellites in daily life are now ubiquitous. Dramatic
telescopic images reveal the grandeur of the cosmos as never
before. Robotic rovers have spent years exploring the surface of
our nearest neighboring planet, while new precise measuring
techniques have revealed the existence of hundreds of planets
around nearby stars. China recently sent its first human into
space, and the USA has established plans for human travel to
Mars. Even recreational uses of space are now at hand. The 21st
century will see the human presence in space develop into an
integral aspect of human social and economic life.
These prospects raise many issues. Accordingly, policies
shaping current space activities are much debated in many
arenas around the globe. The agenda of issues is wide-ranging,
including improving space surveillance data and traffic
management, preventing and mitigating space debris, concerns
over space security and possible weapons deployment, the use* An earlier version of this article was presented at the Oxford Futures
Forum, University of Oxford, 22 October 2005.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: wlhuntle@nps.edu (W.L. Huntley).
1 ‘‘Human presence’’ as used here refers to all facets of human space-related
activities, including biological, mechanical and observational.
0265-9646/$ - see front matter  2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.spacepol.2009.11.007
Please cite this article in press as: Wade L Huntley et al., Planning the unplan
j.spacepol.2009.11.007of space travel for scientific advancement, the implications of
‘‘space tourism,’’ and the possibility of eventual ‘‘space
colonization’’ for scientific, exploratory and commercial
purposes.
These debates benefit from considerable ongoing efforts to
generate relevant information, both technical and political.
The decision-making processes often reflect the input of the
many constituencies with near-term stakes in their outcomes.
But lacking from these debates is a comprehensive and
informed set of visions for the overarching objectives of the
advancing human presence in space.
This absence is ironic, given that human interests in space
are intrinsically visionary. Perhaps no other element of
contemporary human life so inspires the imagination. Science
fiction wonderment has motivated careers. In many nations,
space-related achievements epitomize national purpose and
pride. At this level, we are rife with visions.
But dreams do not constitute a basis for serious public
policy planning. Lacking are what might best be termed
‘‘realistic visions’’ e that is, a set of integrated ideas about
possibilities cast against the background of varying
constraints, tradeoffs, and uncertainties. Realistic visions
would map out how interests and forces operating within the
expanding human presence in space will interact to produce
outcomes over longer-term time frames.nable: Scenarios on the future of space, Space Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/
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2 For a recent comment on this problem, see Brian Weeden, ‘‘Alternatives to
a spaceweapons treaty,’’Bulletinof theAtomicScientists,April 17,2009 (http://www.
thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/alternatives-to-space-weapons-treaty). Consid-
erationsof this issue toooftenoverlook that definitions arenot givenobjectively; they
aremerely arbitrary boundaries linking a set of concepts for linguistic clarity. Hence,
definitions are never factually right or wrong; they are either more or less useful in
advancing communication and analysis. Conceptual clarity alone should determine
whether or not, for example, a satellite providing guidance data to an ICBM should
count as a ‘‘space weapon.’’ Unfortunately, the political consequences of such
debates obscure this otherwise purely academic exercise: whether or not the ‘‘space
weapons’ threshold is perceived to have been crossed already has policy-relevant
normative import regardless of the facts in orbit.
3 Moltz usefully distinguishes two intermediate but qualitatively distinct
positions, ‘‘technological determinism’’ and ‘‘social interactionism.’’ James
Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit
of National Interests (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
4 While in the U.S. there is political and programmatic demarcation between
civil andmilitary space activities, there is also spillover between the sectors and the
generally perceived security interest flowing from any perceived threats to vital
commercial capabilities. U.S. military reliance on commercial communication
bandwidth in certain circumstances is a poignant example; for assessments see
Patrick Rayermann, ‘‘Exploiting Commercial SATCOM: A Better Way,’’
Parameters, Winter 2003-04, pp. 54e66 (http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/
Parameters/03winter/rayerman.htm); Benjamin D. Forest, ‘‘An Analysis of Mili-
tary Use of Commercial Satellite Communications,’’ Master’s Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, September 2008 (http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/
oai?verb¼getRecord&metadataPrefix¼html&identifier¼ADA488621).
5 Specifically, the Chinese action spotlighted concerns over ‘‘asymmetric
vulnerability’’ of space assets e i.e., vulnerabilities costlier to protect than for
adversaries to attack, and therefore not remedied by significant U.S. capability
advantages.
2 W.L. Huntley et al. / Space Policy xx (2009) 1e14
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ARTICLE IN PRESSVisions must also account for variance on ultimate aspira-
tions. Hence, no single vision can suffice; such visions are not
themselves policy-setting directions. Rather, creative visions
of this nature contribute to contemporary policy debates by
providing a foundation, beyond simple speculation, for tracing
the potential longer-term consequences of immediate policy
questions. Even in the absence of global value convergence,
such visions can enable policy makers to anticipate and pre-
emptively solve many of the challenges that the advancing
human presence in space will pose.
Without such reflection, policy making is driven by extant
knowledge, current political forces and short-term objectives.
As in many other areas of human life, the long-term conse-
quences of a perpetually ad hoc and unintegrated decision-
making process may please no-one. The incorporation of
serious visions into policy-making processes will not insure
the ‘‘best’’ outcomes e impossible in the absence of global
values consensus e but they can help avoid the worst
outcomes, which are easier to identify.
The future of the human presence in space is, of course,
unpredictable. Uncertainty pervades two discrete dimen-
sions: we do not know how technology and the material
prospects of the human presence in space will evolve, and we
do not know how space-relevant human organizational
processes will evolve either on or off the Earth. This
unpredictability greatly complicates the development of
policy-useful visions of the long-term human presence in
space.
This article addresses that challenge. The first section
begins with an overview of contemporary space security
dilemmas: their disposition will fundamentally shape
humanity’s space future. But space security is also only one
of many issue areas within which dilemmas of unanticipated
outcomes exist. The second section then outlines the objec-
tives and techniques of a scenario-building process
successfully utilized in military and business sectors to
provide structured assessment of potential future directions
across multiple issue-areas in the context of high uncertainty.
The third section describes an initial effort, undertaken by
two of this article’s authors, to apply this process to ques-
tions of space futures. The article concludes with comments
on some prospects for applying this approach more
extensively.
2. The future of space security
Space security cuts across the uncertainty of the future of
humanity’s presence in space. The concerns and controversies
over the potential of warfare to be conducted in or through
space highlight these uncertainties. No-one favors such
a prospect, of course. But there is no agreement on the means
of avoiding it e or even on the priority of avoiding it, in the
context of other terrestrial security tradeoffs.
For the better part of the past decade, the focus of these
concerns has been the prospect of space weaponization. But
here as well, there is no consensus on the definition of
a ‘‘space weapon’’ or even agreement on whether or not suchPlease cite this article in press as: Wade L Huntley et al., Planning the unplan
j.spacepol.2009.11.007capabilities have already been deployed.2 Certainly, a number
of governments currently maintain capabilities in space that
facilitate terrestrial (land, sea or air) military activities,
including use of force. However, many of these capabilities
unambiguously promote peace and stability e satellites
providing early warning of missile launches and surveillance,
for example, enable national technical verification of arms
control agreements, daily reassurance of the absence of
malicious intentions and deterrence-enhancing confidence in
crisis-response capabilities.
The factors driving space-based security and military
considerations are complex and opaque. Debate on space
security issues tends to highlight opposing conceptions of
autonomy and collectivity among spacefaring states; what
James Clay Moltz has termed ‘‘space nationalism’’ and
‘‘global institutionalism’’.3 But there are also common
threads among these positions less apparent than their
divergences.
The USA, widely acknowledged to be the world’s domi-
nant military space power, increasingly relies on both mili-
tary and civilian satellite resources for a wide array of
terrestrial military functions.4 Many strategists perceive US
space reliance as exposing potential vulnerabilities in broader
US force postures. The rapid pace of technological change
has fueled concerns that the timelines for maintaining
adequate degrees of confidence are unpredictable. China’s
January 2007 launch of a missile to destroy a defunct
Chinese satellite, displaying anti-satellite weapon capabil-
ities, punctuated these concerns.5nable: Scenarios on the future of space, Space Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/
10 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
3W.L. Huntley et al. / Space Policy xx (2009) 1e14
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ARTICLE IN PRESSThe Bush administration came to power pushing ambi-
tious goals for research and development of space-related
weapons systems while stone-walling diplomatic initiatives
to restrain such efforts. The administration’s 2006 National
Space Policy articulated the underlying purposes to sustain
‘‘unhindered’’ US space access, to oppose any legal regimes
or arms control agreements restricting US space activities,
and to ‘‘develop and deploy space capabilities that sustain
US advantage.’’6 This posture reinforced earlier US military
doctrinal developments establishing intentions to maintain
US dominance in space for the foreseeable future, and
reflected wider administration military force posture
intentions.7
In truth, there has never been unanimity even among US
military strategists that qualitative leaps forward in weapo-
nizing space would satisfactorily answer immediate threat
concerns. Indeed, many of the doctrinal ambitions for devel-
oping space weapons resulted not from unified national policy
aims but from parochial bureaucratic processes and political
competitions. The Bush administration considerably increased
funding for research and development of advanced space
weapons, but as time passed funding flows also fell short of
doctrinal ambitions.8
Behind these concerns, however, has been a consistent
presumption that the increasing militarization of space and
the ever-present potential for space-related combat are an
inevitable result of natural historical progression. For
example, the US Space Command’s widely-circulated 1998
‘‘Vision for 2020’’ anticipated that space would eventually
‘‘evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare’’ and
outlined requisite US preparations for that inevitability.9
The subsequent and more notorious report of the
Commission to Assess United States National Security
Space Management and Organization, chaired by soon-to-be
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, viewed the
eventual extension of warfare into space a ‘‘virtual6 ‘‘U.S. National Space Policy,’’ White House Office of Science and Tech-
nology Policy (OSTP), October 6, 2006 (http://www.ostp.gov/html/US%
20National%20Space%20Policy.pdf). This document updated policy dating to
the Clinton administration. Cf. Wade Boese, ‘‘U.S. Nixes Arms Control in New
Space Policy,’’ Arms Control Today, November 2006 (http://www.armscontrol.
org/act/2006_11/ACSpace); Moltz, The Politics of Space Security, chapter 7.
7 See, for example, the US 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf) and The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America, White House, September 2002
(available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/national/
nss-020920.pdf). For discussions of these broader contexts, see Wade L.
Huntley, ‘‘Smaller State Perspectives on the Future of Space Governance,’’
Astropolitics 5:3 (Fall 2007), pp.237-71, at pp.240-45, and Wade L. Huntley,
‘‘Threats All The Way Down: U.S. Strategic Initiatives in a Unipolar World,’’
Review of International Studies 32:1 (January 2006).
8 For an assessment near the end of the Bush administration’s tenure, see
Theresa Hitchens, Victoria Samson and Sam Black, ‘‘Space Weapons
Spending in the FY 2008 Defense Budget,’’ Center for Defense Information,
February 21, 2007, <http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/Space%20Weapons%20
Spending%20in%20the%20FY%202008%20Defense%20Budget.pdf>.
9 United States Space Command, Vision for 2020, p.4. Available at: http://
www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usspac/visbook.pdf. US Space Command
was formed in 1985 but disbanded in October 2002; its responsibilities were
transferred to US Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
Please cite this article in press as: Wade L Huntley et al., Planning the unplan
j.spacepol.2009.11.007certainty’’, famously warning of an impending ‘‘Space
Pearl Harbor’’, and recommended that the USA ‘‘vigorously
pursue’’ full-scale capabilities for space weapons
deployment.10
TheObama administration seems set to takeUS space policy in
different directions, but reflecting convergent concerns. As
a candidate, the future president explicitly opposed ‘‘the stationing
of weapons in space and the development of anti-satellite
weapons’’ but simultaneously recognized the need ‘‘to protect
[US] assets in space’’ and supported programs ‘‘to make US
systems more robust and less vulnerable.’’11 Shortly after his
inauguration, President Obama reaffirmed this position by
declaring his intention to seek a ban on space weapons; but White
House policy emphasized barring weapons that could interfere
with US satellites, thereby linking the policy directly to securing
US space-based capabilities.12
The new directions of the present administration encourage
long-standing advocates of more multilateral approaches to
space security challenges. However, these directions are
ambivalent on the deeper presumption of the inevitability of
space-based conflict, if not weaponization. Recent interest
among US military strategists in the prerequisites for estab-
lishing and maintaining ‘‘space deterrence’’13 reflect conti-
nuity in this vein of thinking.
Driven in large measure by concerns over US intentions,
most other countries categorically oppose weaponization of
space and have supported efforts to expand the Outer Space
Treaty (OST) to control and limit future military expansions
into space.14 Evolving coalitions of states have consistently
endorsed negotiation of a further Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space (PAROS) agreement. In the past
decade, Russia and China have led these efforts; but at timesManagement and Organization, January 11, 2001. The full report is available
at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html.
11 Obama for America, ‘‘Advancing the Frontiers of Space Exploration,’’ N.
D. (http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/policy/Space_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf).
12 Turner Brinton, ‘‘Obama’s Proposed Space Weapon Ban Draws Mixed
Response,’’ Space News, February 4, 2009 (http://www.space.com/news/
090204-obama-space-weapons-response.html). The Obama administration is
due to deliver a Congressionally-mandated Space Posture Review in
December 2009, and is undertaking a space policy review intended to produce
a new National Space Policy by the middle of 2010.
13 See Ambassador Roger G. Harrison, Major Deron R. Jackson, and Collins G.
Shackelford, ‘‘SpaceDeterrence:TheDelicateBalance ofRisk,’’ EisenhowerCenter
for Space and Defense Studies; in Space and Defense (forthcoming); for a critique,
see Nancy Gallagher, ‘‘A Reassurance-based Approach to Space Security,’’ Inter-
national SecurityResearch andOutreachProgramme,Department ofForeignAffairs
and InternationalTradeCanada,October2009,pp.23-5 (http://www.cissm.umd.edu/
papers/files/a_reassurance_based_approach_to_space_security.pdf).
14 While the OST reserves space ‘‘exclusively for peaceful purposes,’’ it prohibits
only the stationing in space of ‘‘nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass
destruction.’’ Just as freedom of navigation on the high seas does not preclude
warships’ use of the oceans, the ‘‘RumsfeldReport’’ explicitly portrays unprohibited
space weaponization as consistent with ‘‘peaceful use’’ and with US obligations
under theUNCharter and theOuterSpaceTreaty.Reportof theCommission toAssess
United States National Security Space Management and Organization, January 11,
2001, p.17 (http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.html).
nable: Scenarios on the future of space, Space Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/
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ARTICLE IN PRESSmany significant US allies (such as Canada) have joined the
call.15
Notably, many supporters of establishing treaty-based control
of future military-related space activities share the judgment that
technological advancement is creating genuine security implica-
tions rendering existing space regulation increasingly insufficient,
and encouraging the expectation that, absent stronger controls,
weaponization may indeed be inevitable. Here also, China’s
ASAT-testing satellite shoot-down has been taken as a demonstra-
tion of these conclusions.16 Whereas space nationalists and space
globalists differ markedly on prescriptions, the underlying diag-
noses of contemporary forces and prospects are more convergent.
This observation casts light on the common view that
ambitions to create a binding space governance regime merely
reflect idealist aspirations for global cooperation. But states
supporting treaty-based restraints on space weapons develop-
ment typically have made appraisals of their national space
security interests just as realist as those by the USA. The
different responses to these concerns by these countries reflect
the differences in the content of their interests and in their
relative capabilities to pursue them.
The USA, as the dominant military space actor, often
expresses a familiar ‘‘great power’’ response to space security
developments. Other countries’ perspectives may differ along
three dimensions. First, they face the consequences of pos-
sessing less e or no e capacity to redress their space security
concerns by their own resources.17 Second, their interests may
include more relative attention to civil and commercial space15 A recent and more developed Russia-China joint proposal is: ‘‘Treaty on
the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use
of Force against Space Objects,’’ February 12, 2008 (http://www.mfa.gov.cn/
eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjfywj/t408357.htm, accessed November 2009). On Cana-
da’s role, see ‘‘Space Security,’’ Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade, July 15, 2008 (<a href¼http://www.international.gc.ca/
arms-armes/non_nuclear-non_nucleaire/space_security-securite_spatiale.
aspx?lang¼en&menu_id¼120&menu¼R, accessed March 2009). The Obama
administration’s stated embrace of a negotiated space weapons treaty may
prove less auspicious than is at first apparent; with the common ground of
opposition to US resistance eliminated, genuine negotiations may reveal
divergent interests among other states as to exactly what such a treaty should
look like.
16 See, e.g., K.K. Nair, ‘‘China’s ASAT Test: A Demonstrated Need for Legal
Reform,’’ Journal of Space Law (Summer 2007). Arms control advocates saw
the February 2008 US use of a modified sea-based theater missile defense
interceptor to destroy a malfunctioning US satellite as further evidence of
a potential space arms race dynamic emerging. US officials, however, cited
several differences in the situations to contend the US action was not a parallel
ASAT test.
17 What matters here is not an absolute capacity to develop any relevant
military space capabilities, but a capacity to do so relative to one’s rivals.
Therefore, an ability to develop a capability that is easily and less expensively
neutralized by an adversary does no good. On the other hand, a cheap
asymmetric capability that effectively balances an adversary’s more extensive
capabilities may be sufficient, especially in redressing a specifically-defined
security concern. China’s interest in ASAT technologies and Israel’s pursuit of
autonomous capabilities are examples. For a discussion of the competitive and
self-reliant nature of space security, see Barry D. Watts, ‘‘The Military Use of
Space: A Diagnostic Assessment,’’ Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, February 2001 (http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/
PubLibrary/R.20010201.The_Military_Use_o/R.20010201.The_Military_
Use_o.pdf).
Please cite this article in press as: Wade L Huntley et al., Planning the unplan
j.spacepol.2009.11.007activities, with space security concerns limited to the prereq-
uisite of a peaceful space environment in which to conduct
those activities. Finally, they may worry that, because of their
smaller role, their interests may be abused not only from
others’ malice but from their ignorance and neglect. States for
which these differences hold take the perspective of ‘‘lesser
powers’’ with respect to space security. Each of these differ-
ences motivates lesser powers to pursue their interests through
some form of structured relationship, which may include
either exclusive alliances or inclusive regimes.18
The particular nature of space-related issues exaggerates these
tendencies.All states have an equivalent ‘‘proximity’’ to space, and
many, as consumers of space-based communications and imaging
products, tend to perceive immediate interests in activities there.
For this reason, weaker states tend to view the consequences of
conflict in space in absolute rather than proximate terms, even if
their capacity to influence events in space is particularly limitede
akin to weaker states’ outlooks on nuclear conflict. This conver-
gence between particular and generalized interests induces these
states to perceive broadly shared interests; in turn, the absolute
nature of the consequences of space conflict increases the
perceived utility of broad-based multilateral collaboration (versus
exclusive alliances). Hence, advocacy of shared international
principles and multilateral agreements by such states reflects
a realistic response to the particular circumstances they face.
The ‘‘realism’’ of the appeal among lesser-powered states
of treaty-based regime solutions to space weaponization
concerns underscores the observation, noted above, that
‘‘great’’ and ‘‘lesser’’ powers share a similar diagnosis of the
underlying space security condition: namely, that inevitable
technological advancement combined with the anarchic rivalry
of states will, in the absence of restraint, lead ineluctably to
the weaponization of space. These outlooks vary less on the
nature of the political forces driving current circumstances
than on the possibility and desirability of containing those
forces. Hence, the alternative to weaponization is sometimes
presented as the preservation of space as a peaceful ‘‘sanc-
tuary’’, holding at bay the terrestrial pressures that would
otherwise invade the pristine space environment.19
This presumption that weaponry and warfare in space can
be prevented only by restraining the endemic forces of human
conflict suggests a limitation of vision. The concept is one of
straightforward negation, as in a dike holding back a surging
sea or a wall resisting encroaching hordes. Negation goals
omit the prospect that the underlying pressures themselves
may be in some manner relieved. With respect to space
security, this means addressing whether the security dynamics
generating potential for weaponization and conflict in space18 ‘‘Great’’ and ‘‘lesser’’ powers as used here represent ideal types; states,
including the United States, may express elements of both outlooks. For an
elaboration of these observations, see Wade L. Huntley, ‘‘Smaller State
Perspectives on the Future of Space Governance,’’ Astropolitics 5:3 (Fall
2007), pp.237-71, at pp.252e7.
19 Representatively: Michael E. O’Hanlon Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary:
Constraining the Military Uses of Space (Brookings Institution Press, 2004);
Bruce M. Deblois, ‘‘Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy,’’ Airpower
Journal 12:4 (Winter 1998), pp.41e57.
nable: Scenarios on the future of space, Space Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/
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dependence upon static treaty structures allows.
That deeper level involves the dynamic nature of state
interests themselves. Most proposals for international cooper-
ation in space security activities, whether a full-fledged formal
PAROS-like treaty, or more modest arrangements to fashion
‘‘rules of the road’’, emphasize the potential to realize states’
existing common interests. Such cooperation, even when insti-
tutionalized, may endure only so long as the underlying interest
convergence persists; and given the energetic expansion and
evolving nature of the human presence in space, the persistence
of interest convergence cannot be assumed. As circumstances
move tectonically, the energies required to keep intact the
structures built upon those foundations increase to a point of
unsustainability. Conflict’s trumping of regimes remains, in
some sense, inevitable.20
Few space security analysts have focused on the possibilities
for cooperation to functionmore organically as an element of the
evolution of human space activities, rather than simply as
a structure applied to that evolution. The more organic possi-
bility reflects the potential over time for cooperative agreements
and institutions to change state interests themselves. Processes
facilitating such evolution include strategic interest conver-
gence, information creation and sharing, ‘‘spillover’’ and
‘‘feedback’’ effects, issue scope expansion and integration, and
the facilitation of transnational linkages. Interacting synergis-
tically with the interests they are influencing, such cooperation
evolves dynamically as well. As such cooperation deepens its
roots among all parties, it can begin to endure self-sustainably.21
The potential for more organic principles and cooperative
institutions to shape the nature of political relations them-
selves suggests a more expansive concept of the underlying
nature of interstate relations e one that need not always
resemble the realist image of a Hobbesian ‘‘war of all against
all’’. Hedley Bull’s ‘‘anarchical society’’ and Daniel Deud-
ney’s ‘‘negarchy,’’ for example, capture the past and present
existence of international political orders that, despite the
absence of hierarchical government, have functioned as
qualitatively distinct governance systems.22 Application of
concepts of qualitatively distinct political ordering principles
to developing governance conditions of the future human20 Realists are right to further observe that this type of fixed cooperation can
occasionally bemoredeleterious topreventing conflict thanhad it never existed, such
as if a crisis-driven collapse of a cooperative regime exacerbates the crisis itself.
21 For a good introduction to the copious literature on this topic, see Robert
Jervis, ‘‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the
Debate,’’ International Security, 24:1 (Summer 1999), pp.42-63, at pp.58-62.
Jervis notes that cooperative institutions capable of shaping the interests of
states can potentially take on ‘‘a life of their own,’’ producing unforeseen and
unintended e and potentially communally undesirable e outcomes (Ibid, p59
& p60n47). This prospect underscores the utility of vision-building as a means
to better anticipate consequences and shape the design of cooperative princi-
ples and institutions.
22 Hedley Bull, ‘‘Society and Anarchy in International Relations,’’ Diplo-
matic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics, ed. Herbert
Butter field and Martin Wight (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1966); Daniel Deudney, ‘‘The Philadelphia System - Sovereignty, Arms-
Control, and Balance Of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787e
1861,’’ International Organization 49:2, (Spring 1995), pp. 191e228.
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interests and capabilities with respect to space activities
suggests a relatively large potential for organized cooperation
to influence their evolution. Such cooperative principles and
institutions would then become intrinsic to the dynamic
political forces shaping the expanding human presence in
space, growing and evolving with them, rather than acting as
exogenous static structures seeking to constrain those forces.24
The rate and uncertainty of change in both the technological
and political dimensions of expanding human space activities
complicates this task. Herein lies the value of ‘‘realistic visions’’.
Rigorous articulations of the interplay of the wide variety of
constraints, tradeoffs, uncertainties, and values entailed in human
expansion into space can facilitate evaluation of the applicability
of alternative governance concepts to human space activities in
the context of dynamic change.
Among other things, such visions can explore how alter-
native futures in space are intimately linked to terrestrial
conditions. As the human presence in space develops into an
integral aspect of global life, it will increasingly reflect the
prevailing conditions of global life. Anticipation of space
weaponization premises continued earthly insecurity and
conflict, while ambitions for growing commercial and
exploratory development of space presume increasing inter-
national integration and collaboration. A future in which space
becomes a domain of conflict and arms race competition may
be irreconcilable with visions for increasing peaceful human
presence embodied in today’s growing commercial and
exploratory activities. Choices among alternative futures for
the human presence in space may depend upon choices among
alternative futures for life on Earth as well.
The following section reviews the potential for scenario-
building techniques to inform these choices by providing
rigorous detailed visions of future worlds that account for
a wide range of current realities and span the spectra of the
most important uncertainties. The resulting plausible, inte-
grated visions can yield feasible policy-relevant insights that
demonstrably enable current policy making to be more far-
sighted. Beyond the fruits of the exercises themselves, the
longer time-frames entailed in scenario building also facilitate
dialogue among diverse parties divided on nearer-term ques-
tions. The collaboration enabled can inspire innovation and23 For an initial effort, see Wade L. Huntley, ‘‘Smaller State Perspectives on
the Future of Space Governance,’’ Astropolitics 5:3 (Fall 2007), pp.237e71, at
pp. 258e66.
24 James Clay Moltz’s description of the role of learning in fostering US-
Soviet space security cooperation e and the role of ‘‘unlearning’’ in its demise
e denotes the importance of accounting for, and if possible planning, dynamic
interest evolution among principal space-faring states. See Moltz, The Politics
of Space Security, esp. pp.59-63. Calls for building a space security regime
around the principle of assurance rather than conflict also moves in this
direction. See Nancy Gallagher, ‘‘A Reassurance-based Approach to Space
Security,’’ International Security Research and Outreach Programme,
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, October 2009
(http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/a_reassurance_based_approach_to_
space_security.pdf); cf. Michael Krepon and Christopher Clary, ‘‘Space
Assurance or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space,’’
Henry L. Stimson Center, April 1, 2003 (http://www.stimson.org/wos/pdf/
spacefront.pdf).
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development of a productive ‘‘epistemic community’’25
addressing the full scope of future human space activities.
Vision development is only one aspect of long-term plan-
ning. Comprehensive knowledge generation and strategies for
policy making are also required. But vision development is
currently the least well advanced. All global policy debate,
including US national security policy making, can benefit
from having a fuller range of rigorous and credible assess-
ments of long-term prospects from which to draw.3. The scenario-building method
On 16 March 1966 Neil Armstrong deftly piloted the
Gemini VIII within 0.9 meters of the pre-launched Agena
Target Vehicle, then slowly accomplished the world’s first
orbital docking. Armstrong and co-pilot David Scott were still
in a celebratory mood, when Scott noticed the Gemini
beginning to roll. Armstrong used the Orbit Attitude and
Maneuvering System thrusters, but the moment he throttled
down, they started to roll again. Turning off the Agena seemed
to stop the problem for a few minutes. But when it began
again, the roll was accelerating. They undocked and with
a long burst of translation thrusters moved away from the
Agena. But the roll continued to accelerate. Tumbling now at
one revolution per second, the astronauts were in danger of
impaired vision and loss of consciousness. But Armstrong was
able to bring the wild oscillations under control thanks in part
to preparation by a flight simulation training exercise that
many pilots disliked, believing the simulation was too unlikely
to waste their scarce training time and energy on.26 Fortu-
nately, NASA did not plan the astronauts’ training based on
the most likely scenarios. Instead, they planned on the basis of
plausible and important scenarios.
Developing plausible scenarios helps us take the long view
in a world of great uncertainty.27 Scenarios are narratives of
the future defined around a set of unpredictable drivers,
intended to expand insight by identifying unexpected but
important possible directions and outcomes. Scenarios have
a timeline over which meaningful change is possible. They are
a useful tool for examining a number of different possible
futures. They provide a means to stimulate new thinking,
challenge assumptions, and provide an effective framework for
dialogue among a diverse group of stakeholders. They can25 Epistemic communities are networks whose individuals share both
consensual knowledge and problem-solving ambitions. Epistemic communi-
ties differ from scientific disciplines by also sharing social action intentions,
but differ from typical interest groups in not necessarily sharing norms and
goals. Rather, such communities are marked by a commitment to continuing
research and information gathering and self-conscious openness to revising
convictions and policy goals in light of new factual data. The concept is widely
applied with respect to global environmental issues. See Peter M. Haas,
‘‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Co-ordina-
tion,’’ International Organization 1992; 46(1): 1e36.
26 Hacker, Barton C. and Grimwood, James M., On the Shoulders of Titans: A
History of Project Gemini, NASA Special Publication-4203 in the NASA
History Series, 1977.
27 Schwartz, Peter, The Art of the Long View, Currency Doubleday, 1991.
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goals and interests that transcend current political divides.
Scenarios thus help to develop the means to work towards
preferred futures.28
Scenarios are stories about the way the world might turn out
tomorrow; they do not need to be likely, but they ought to be
plausible, internally consistent, and relevant. It is precisely by
considering possible, even if not necessarily likely, scenarios
that we are best prepared for the unpredictability of the future.
By encouraging creative thinking beyond the future we antici-
pate, scenarios help us become more resilient to unexpected
events.
With respect to their utility in guiding policy development,
three features distinguish good scenarios from simple specu-
lations, linear predictions or fanciful musings of the future:
Scenarios are decision focused. Successful scenarios
begin and end by clarifying the decisions and actions the
participants must make if they are to deal successfully with
an uncertain future. One common misconception of
scenarios is that they are prescient, path dependent predic-
tions of the future. On the contrary, scenarios are used to
order our thoughts amid uncertainty, build common ground
among differing perspectives, and think rationally about our
options. The value of a set of scenarios accrues not from
their accuracy or likelihood, but from their plausibility and
the insights they generate.
Scenarios are imaginative. In examining a decision within
the context of a number of different futures, scenarios require
us to look behind fixed assumptions. They encourage partici-
pants to challenge conventional wisdom, create new contexts
for existing decisions, and think creatively about options for
surmounting obstacles. At their core, then, scenarios are about
learning.29
Scenarios are logical. The scenario process is formal and
disciplined in its use of information and analysis. The
creativity and imagination inspired by scenarios can only be
as effective as it is based in realistic assessments. In
requiring participants to challenge each others’ thoughts,
perceptions, and mind-sets, the process helps clarify that
reality.
Scenarios first emerged following World War II as
a method of military planning. This approach was reflected
in Herman Kahn’s assertion of the need to ‘‘think the
unthinkable’’ concerning the possibilities and implications of
war in the atomic age. ‘‘In our times’’, Kahn wrote in 1966,
‘‘thermonuclear war may seem unthinkable, immoral,
insane, hideous, or highly unlikely, but it is not impos-
sible’’.30 Kahn’s motivation was, in part, recognition of the
counter-intuitive notion that planning could be a necessary
means of avoidance.28 Kees van der Heijden. Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation. 2nd
Edition. (West Sussex, England: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.; 2005).
29 On the important role of learning in international relations, see Ernst B.
Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International
Organizations (Berkeley: University of California Press 1990).
30 Kahn, Herman, Thinking About the Unthinkable, Avon Books, 1966.
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sophistication with the work of Pierre Wack, a planner at the
London offices of Royal Dutch/Shell. Wack and his colleagues
refined the application of scenario thinking to private enter-
prise. This work helped Shell anticipate the consequences of
the emergence of a cartel among oil exporting countries, and
to develop various plans to cushion the blow that would (and
did) result from formation of the Organization of the Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. Shell was also
able to anticipate massive economic and political change in
the then USSR in the late 1980s.31
Scenario analysis came to be used in the political arena
when associates of Wack assisted stakeholders in South
Africa in the peaceful transition from apartheid to democ-
racy. Many doubted the country’s prospects; in 1987, the
Guardian Weekly quoted Margaret Thatcher’s former
spokesman Bernard Ingham as saying that anyone who
believed the African National Congress (ANC) would one
day rule South Africa was ‘‘living in cloud cuckoo land.’’32
But with operations in South Africa and an interest in pre-
venting anarchy following the downfall of apartheid, Shell
sent some of Wack’s prote´ge´s, including Adam Kahane, to
convene meetings of top governmental, religious, civic and
business leaders at a conference site there called Mont Fleur.
From February 1990, when Nelson Mandela was released
from prison, to April 1994, when the first all-race elections
were held, participants identified relatively certain and
uncertain but plausible factors, and then formed into teams to
research various alternative futures. In the midst of deep
conflict and uncertainty, ‘‘Mont Fleur’’ brought people
together from across ideological and political divides to
think creatively about the future of their country. The
collaboratively drafted scenarios were not a panacea, but did
contribute to establishing a common vocabulary and enough
mutual understanding for participants to find common
ground on complex decisions. In particular, the consensus on
the undesirability of three particular scenarios contributed to
developing the perception of shared interests that was an
important element in the success of the governmental
transition.33
Scenario-building and analysis has become a distinct tool
of US government policy making, and has been applied
directly to future space security issues. For example, one
major US Air Force scenario-based study evaluated 25
emerging technologies and 40 separate potential weapons31 Schwartz, Peter, The Art of the Long View, Currency Doubleday, 1991.
32 http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/aug/27/uk.conservatives1,
accessed 1 November 2009. The ANC became the ruling party in South Africa
in 1994. It gained support in the 1999 elections, and further increased its
majority in 2004.
33 Adam Kahane, Solving Tough Problems: An Open Way of Talking,
Listening, and Creating New Realities. San Francisco: BarretteKoehle, 2004.
See also Graham Galer, ‘‘South Africa: scenarios of the future as apartheid
was ending,’’ paper presented at the Oxford Futures Forum, October 22, 2005,
available at http://www.oxfordfuturesforum.org.uk/Submissions.asp, accessed
29 October 09, p. 14; and Liam Fahey and Robert M. Randall, Learning from
the Future: Competitive Foresight Scenarios. (NY: John Wiley and Sons,
1997), pp. 326e327.
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effort to guide future Air Force policy choices.34 This exercise
(and others like it) exemplifies the potential for applying non-
linear future planning methodologies to large-scale public
policy topics, including the future of space. The principal
deficiency of such government-sponsored efforts is simply the
narrowness of their focus e they are, by design, only con-
cerned about a single government’s decision points and are
shaped by the goals, dilemmas and uncertainties most relevant
to that single party. Lacking is a parallel process to achieve the
same kind of expansive thinking while also incorporating
a full range of stakeholders. Such exercises can hardly be
generated by governments.
Among non-governmental organizations, application of
scenario thinking is still in its infancy. Initial efforts have
concentrated on seeking to engage a broad variety of stake-
holders around complex global issues. The Nautilus Institute
has used the collaborative writing of scenario narratives to
facilitate international dialogue in the Pacific Rim around
adaptation to climate change, terrorism, and socio-technolog-
ical change.35 The Virtual ThinkNet, a scenarios-based
initiative led by Weingartner Consulting, is currently using
scenarios to formulate recommendations for the Canadian
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the
future of CanadaeNorth Korea relations.36 The scenario-
building exercise described in the next section of this article
represents a first non-governmental application of scenario
thinking to space issues.
Different types of scenarios are appropriate for different
needs. Technocratic scenarios are oriented towards states and
planning. Anticipatory scenarios aim to help organizations
survive in an uncertain world. Generative scenarios identify
policy opportunities that may realize values and transform the
future, often by embracing uncertainty as a basis of strategy.
It is this last type of scenario-building and analysis that is
most appropriate for initiating and continuing dialogue around
the future use of space. Generative scenarios are particularly
well suited to addressing three core challenges:
 anticipating the technological changes relevant to the full
range of the growing human utilization of space that will
inevitably unfold over the coming decades;
 guiding and planning integration across the full range of
human space activities in conjunction with evolving
terrestrial political conditions;
 identifying and responding to the critical uncertainties
over the directions and implications of long-term devel-
opments in both the previous dimensions.34 Air Force 2025 Executive Summary found at http://csat.au.af.mil/2025/e_
s.pdf, p. 20, accessed 01 November 2009. For a more detailed recounting of
this study, see Wade L. Huntley, ‘‘Smaller State Perspectives on the Future of
Space Governance,’’ Astropolitics 5:3 (Fall 2007), pp.237-71, at pp.241e3.
35 See: Nautilus Institute, 2006, Open Minds, Open Futures, Melbourne,
http://www.nautilus.org/gps/scenarios/Scenarios2006.pdf accessed 01
November 2009.
36 See: http://futuretrip.wordpress.com/canada-dprk-relations/ accessed 01
November 2009.
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Table 1
Key drivers of the future of outer space.
Low Earth Orbit/Near Earth (LEO/NEO).
Level of awareness of populace and political demands.
Relationship between US and China, Russia, India.
Energy and degree of cooperation.
Degree of state authenticity over commercial interest.
Degree and speed of technology and proliferation of technology.
Speed of deployment of space law.
Relationship of military authority to civil or/and criminal authority.
Social aversion to war.
Rule of law versus rule of power.
Demographic shifts
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providing rigorous, detailed visions of future worlds
accounting for a wide range of variables, inevitable change and
uncertainty. The collaboration entailed in scenario building
can also inspire the creativity and imagination of an expert
community representing diverse viewpoints on immediate
issues. The resulting plausible, integrated visions, responsive
to current realities and robust against future uncertainties, can
yield feasible policy-relevant ideas for promoting peaceful
development of the future human presence in space despite the
wide range of possible future developments both in space and
on Earth.
As noted earlier, vision development is only one aspect of
long-term planning. A comprehensive knowledge base and
strategies for policy-making are also required. By integrating
expertise in these other areas into vision development,
scenario-building exercises can contribute valuable long-term
insights to policy debates. The following section reports the
results of one such exercise.
4. Space futures scenarios4.1. The space scenarios workshop38 One way to think of driving forces is as elements of the plot in a story. TheOn 12e13 May 2008 a two-day workshop brought
together experts on a diverse range of military, commercial
and civil space activities, utilizing scenario building to create
detailed visions of future developments in space.37 The
scenarios were intended to be highly credible, rigorously
accounting for multiple driving forces in the context of
inevitable change and uncertainty. The scenarios developed
in this workshop engage with contemporary policy-relevant
challenges and advance the goal of strategic planning for
longer-term space futures.
The three scenarios produced in the workshop are not
meant to be predictive. The future will undoubtedly contain
elements of each, as well as many novel features the exercise
did not capture. Rather, the scenarios intend to stimulate
awareness among stakeholders of the potential for trans-
formative and dramatic change, and the consequences of
unpredictability for various strategies and actions.
The project had as its core purposes:
 articulation of the norms, institutions, policies and adap-
tations to technological change required to realize the full
positive potential of human space presence in the viably
imaginable worlds of 2033;
 anticipation of the prospects and obstacles to establishing
governance conditions for the human presence in space in
2033 under which the absence of deployed weapons and
arms races is stable, self-sustaining and consistent with
terrestrial governance conditions.37 The workshop was convened by the Simons Centre for Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation Research with the collaboration of the Center for Interna-
tional Relations, at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada.
Co-authors of this article Wade Huntley and Miranda Weingartner facilitated
the workshop. For information on participants, see Acknowledgements.
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the workshop’s ‘‘focal question’’, which provides the anchor
for all subsequent discussions, pulls together existing knowl-
edge and creates the platform for further exploration. The
focal question for the workshop became: ‘‘Will space be
weaponized by 2033?’’ In coalescing around this question,
participants took it as a starting point that space is already
militarized, if not yet ‘‘weaponized’’. Participants also decided
to leave the definition of a ‘‘space weapon’’ unspecified at the
outset, so that this issue could be a generative variable shaped
by the scenarios themselves, rather than a fixed constraint
imposed on them.4.2. Generating the scenariosThe group then determined ‘driving forces’, that is, the key
factors already influencing the future one way or the other. The
building blocks of scenarios, driving forces bring to the table
the full range of factors that influence the world in which one
must operate. They are a device for honing initial judgment
and helping decide which factors will be significant or
insignificant.38
The consensus drivers were then collated into a single
document, listed in Table 1.
The group was then asked to pull ‘‘key critical uncertainties’’
from this list. ’’Critical uncertainties’’ are those drivers that are
likely to have the greatest influence on events, and drive events
towards a highly unpredictable outcome. None of the original
drivers is eliminated e drivers not deemed to be the ‘‘critical
uncertainties’’ are taken into account when developing the
scenario narratives. In the end, the group agreed that three
critical uncertainties presented the most challenging combina-
tions and thus served as the basis for building the scenarios.
These are: power determined by the rule of force or rule of law;
technological breakthrough or inertia; scarcity of resources or
abundance of resources.story of Romeo and Juliet could be defined by three driving forces: the
romantic love between the characters; the rivalry between the two families;
and the filial responsibility which binds them. A thorough analysis of this
Shakespearean tragedy would identify several additional forces which affect
the fatal outcome for the lovers. But without the three listed above, there is no
story.
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endpoints from the three critical uncertainty axes that would
define the scenarios.39 They are presented in Fig. 1.
The workshop participants were then divided into three
teams to develop the narratives of the scenarios. Each team of
participants presented three distinct stories and rationale of
plausible futures.4.3. Scenario A: ‘‘Back to the Future’’‘‘Back to the Future’’ describes a future characterized by
a high degree of technological breakthrough wherein power is
projected by rule of force.
In 2009 global tensions create an atmosphere where
nations increasingly test new defensive technology. In
2010 India explodes a satellite out of Low-Earth orbit
(LEO) and the USA tests an orbital interceptor. Gazprom
invests $1 billion in the development of a nanotechnology
research lab. There is also a steady erosion of Outer Space
Treaty norms and limits to protect commerce. By 2013
NATO is dissolved, seen as no longer relevant. The EU
alliance shifts towards defending its borders. Human
spaceflight continues, in an increasingly competitive
atmosphere. The USA launches Aries I, with a crew.
Generation Y seems more interested in environmental
issues than space. By 2014 many nations begin deploying
anti-satellite (ASAT) technology. In 2015 China, the
USA, India and Russia field rival ASATs in orbit, as LEO
orbits are at risk from debris. Commercial interests give
up on LEO and eye the Moon, which fuels the race to
establish a presence there. An increasingly protectionist
USA leaves the World Trade Organization (WTO). In
response, China recalls its debts from the USA. Mean-
while, European and Asian growth continues and, in39 A standard scenario-building technique involves arranging two critical
uncertainty axes orthogonally, yielding a matrix of scenario spaces capturing
all four endpoint combinations. Workshop participants determined during
discussions to develop three scenarios from the three axes.
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nanotubes. The USA and China race to produce the first
space elevator. The civil lunar programs move forward.
By 2020 a joint USeEU team land on and ‘reclaim’ the
Moon. Lunar bases and the space elevator are established,
as resources continue to dwindle on earth. Rival moon
bases compete over mining rights and orbital lasers
promote a defensive arms race in space. NATO is replaced
by a new European Defence Organization (EDO). A
coalition emerges, including the USA, the EU and India,
in opposition to Russia and China. By 2025 African
nations reject the influence of major powers and, thanks to
the proliferation of technology, become space powers in
their own right. In 2028 major powers withdraw from the
Outer Space Treaty. Saudi oil fields are now officially
empty, and the lunar colonies’ major export is solar
power. Military bases on the Moon defend against rival
solar farms. A RussianeChinese coalition attacks the
space elevator, which essentially strands the USeEU
lunar colonies and seriously impairs energy availability on
Earth. The UN breaks down and is dismantled. Treaties
are ignored and tensions increase. The earth is highly
militarized, and conflict occurs both on earth and in space.
The future is tense, dark and uncertain. By 2030 Cali-
fornian scientists claim to have discovered an alleged
artificial signal from outer space. The signal offers the
possibility of a new reason for hope.4.4. Group observations on Scenario AIn this scenario technological breakthroughs add to the rule
of force rather than providing a means for international
cooperation. States come together and drift apart based on
their perceived interests. The group acknowledged the
importance of ‘‘giving teeth’’ to the Outer Space Treaty and
other treaties in order to enhance means of overcoming
conflict in the future. However, treaties do erode when states
or blocs of states perceive these no longer to serve their
interests. Further, norms of the Outer Space Treaty may be
eroded through the commercialization of space, rather than by
conflict and militarization. The group recognized that coop-
eration is possible on some, but not all, issues.
Following the Chinese recent ASAT test there were efforts
to clarify the situation for all parties concerned and prevent
repeat occurrences. This suggests in part that the UN breaking
down is not realistic, and that there might be greater political
will to move in a collaborative direction than the scenario
suggests.
The competition for resources breaks down liberal order
and traps states into a situation where the rule of force is
perceived as the only option. In this scenario democracies are
not less likely to militarize. Politicians bear the responsibility
for the implications of their actions. NASA remains a remnant
of the Cold War, while the EU space plan is geared towards
a broader array of concerns. The voice of civil society is then
squashed. (There is also an option of a scenario where, instead
of the EU, China becomes a regional champion, bringing othernable: Scenarios on the future of space, Space Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/
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work.) The rule of force is also justified for the protection of
investments. An entity such as the US-Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC), which was convened when
one side thought there had been a violation by the other, might
be helpful.
Driving factors come not necessarily from the bottom or the
top, but rather from mid-level officials who can promote
a discussion on the consequences of space weaponization. It is
important to reach out to the non-space community, to help
a wider constituency relate to the issues and take greater
interest. Getting away from focusing on big, one-off, prestige
programs is one way to elicit such an interest.
Technological innovation, while important, does not
necessarily lead to an advantage for the country of origin.
Rapid dissemination of technologies among a certain
community can affect the security of the countries of origin.
For this reason, if weaponization of space is inevitable,
countries should operate as much as possible in a collabora-
tive, transparent fashion. This suggests the utility of a global
regime controlling the technology.
Cooperative leadership among youth could be developed to
help ensure future cooperation. This group underlines the
importance of reaching young people today in order to stim-
ulate awareness in the next generation of leaders of the
negative spirals that could develop. All parties must be made
aware that it is in no one’s interest to attack each other’s
satellites; both sides need the information and need freedom to
access space. A non-interference pact could be developed,
which might name the kinds of weapons not to be used.
One omission in the scenario is the role of domestic space
institutions. It was argued that EU institutions tend towards
more openness than American ones, largely because American
space institutions developed during the Cold War in an
atmosphere of secrecy.4.5. Scenario B: ‘‘Sisyphus’’ (or ‘‘The Never Ending
Story’’)Sisyphus describes a future challenged by a scarcity of
resources but enjoying a high degree of technological
breakthrough.
In 2010 oil prices reach $350 per barrel, resulting in
massive investment in new energy technology by the USA,
India, China and Russia. These investments lead to a leap
in computing capacity. The high price of oil causes global
food shortages. These in turn cause disruptions in the
political order of many nations and massive displacement
of populations towards Northern regions. Canada closes its
borders and calls for the UN to assist its management of US
‘‘economic’’ refugees. Severe water shortages send
shockwaves in the Western world. Famine breaks out in the
Russian Far East. By 2015 10 million people have perished
worldwide from hunger. The global order reorganizes itself
in two opposing blocs. The Union of Democracies (UD)
includes the USA, EU and allies. China signs an armistice
with Russia and Japan, thereby building the opposingPlease cite this article in press as: Wade L Huntley et al., Planning the unplan
j.spacepol.2009.11.007block to the UD. Under civilian pressure, nations scramble
to find a solution to the energy crisis and increase their
cooperation over energy. Turkey and Iran agree to a water
pipeline to the Middle East, increasing tensions between
Israel and surrounding nations. In 2020 a researcher in
Zurich discovers a new element (Fidelium) which leads to
nuclear fusion. The US Air Force tests its first hypersonic
spaceplane. Meanwhile, thanks to increased computing
efficiency, artificial intelligence makes its appearance on
the scene. The USA and allies begin the construction of
a space elevator. By 2025 interest increases in mining for
water on Mars. Artificial nutrient capsules are now mass-
produced and help mitigate the effects of hunger, but only
for those who can afford it leading to an increasing gap
between haves and have-nots. Tensions increase in the
Middle East water-war peace process and Turkey storms
out of talks. AI computers are handed management of the
US nuclear forces. By 2030, thanks to small fusion,
bringing resources from space is now feasible and
economical. Fidelium is confirmed abundant in space,
thanks to asteroid sampling missions. Russia and China
condemn Western refusal to share the fusion formula and
threaten to destroy both the space elevator and the nascent
mining colony in the asteroid belt with a laser weapon
installed in LEO. Space is now, unequivocally,
weaponized.4.6. Group observations on Scenario BScarcity of resources leads to people investigating space for
resources. When water is found to be available from space,
there is a race to acquire the resource, and a scramble to
develop the technology that would enable its acquisition.
Technology breakthrough leads to a strong divide between
developed and developing countries. Technological break-
through may therefore have a more negative impact on inter-
national relations in the context of resource scarcity. Whoever
has the breakthrough holds the advantage, leading to greater
competition among nations and conflict over who gets to
control the benefits. If the breakthrough is in space technology,
then space becomes the arena wherein conflicts will arise. A
key finding is that conflicts pre-dating the technological
breakthrough are not mitigated by it.
A possibility seldom examined is how technological
breakthroughs may have huge unanticipated ramifications.
One example is how increased access to computing power
afforded by a cheaper microchip will bring new players to the
field. New players alter the dynamic. The role of the private
sector is also tenuous in this scenario.
Another actor relevant to the scenario is Israel. Israel is
already considering the development of space weapons. Where
would Israel’s allegiance lie? In this scenario, there are
significant IsraeleIran tensions over water leading to ground
conflict.
Ideology strongly dominates this scenario. It is assumed
that under UD leadership, democracy and the rule of law
prevail. However, the UD may impose its own rule of lawnable: Scenarios on the future of space, Space Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/
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assumption that the UD nations develop the breakthrough
technologies first, and actively prevent development
elsewhere.
In this future, there would be pressure against cooperative
commercial trade. Civil society would also face pressure
from states trying to harness and control it. These states
would not wish the private sector to be in cooperation with
rival blocs.
One major point this scenario illustrates is that technology,
including shared technology, does not necessarily solve the
problem of resource scarcity. Here technology is always driven
by the impulse to compensate for dwindling resources, but
technology itself becomes a driver of tension and impels the
UD to harden its security apparatus.4.7. Scenario C: ‘‘Pax Necessitas’’ (or ‘‘Peace through
Boredom’’)‘‘Pax Necessitas’’ describes a future characterized by
a world where there is little technological advancement and
power is expressed by rule of law.
This scenario begins in 2010, when the USA announces
to the world its intention to form a multilateral treaty on
the use of space, under its leadership. China and Russia
fail to attend and boycott the conference. The EU, for its
part mainly concerned with harmonizing its own national
laws, calls on China and Russia to cease posturing. Some
factions within the EU also call for the expulsion of the
USA from the UN. The EU becomes divided from
within. International tension escalates. In January 2013
a nuclear weapon is detonated in a major US city. A new
administration more committed to international coopera-
tion accepts international assistance to hunt, apprehend
and prosecute the guilty. Investigation reveals that
materials used in the bomb are of Chinese origin. The
USA and China begin dialogue behind closed doors, in
an effort to solve the issue. Meanwhile, the 4000th
satellite is launched. Because of the increased traffic in
space (including the presence of debris), the Satellite
Industry Association (SIA) calls for international space
traffic management - which requires a high degree of
international cooperation (much like air or sea traffic).
Countries reach multilateral agreements around the
sharing of satellite benefits, such as telecommunications,
space research and technology development. Talks begin
around developing international laws governing protec-
tion of intellectual property. The SIA also calls for
transponders on satellites. 2018 is a challenging year for
China. The rising cost of oil and dwindling freshwater
supplies mean soaring food prices and global economic
depression. A space station failure strands Chinese tai-
konauts, who are rescued by a joint RussianeEU effort.
Chinese authorities, already struggling with a famine that
threatens 280 million in the northwest, find themselves
faced with accusations that corruption caused the space
station failure. Civil unrest turns to civil war. ThePlease cite this article in press as: Wade L Huntley et al., Planning the unplan
j.spacepol.2009.11.007Chinese military brokers a deal with the emerging
Chinese democratic movement, which then gains power.
The military recover from the ‘‘taikonauts’’ scandal and
place defensive space objects in orbit, arguing that they
are for peaceful defense against asteroid impact. States
struggle to establish means of cooperation to facilitate
massive humanitarian relief, without the need for sover-
eign consent from nations. In 2023 an international lunar
base is established mainly for the purposes of developing
and seeking new sources of energy. Space tourism, one
way of funding lunar expeditions, is endorsed by the
private sector. A series of talks is underway to develop
a (new) ‘‘Moon treaty’’ dealing with issues such as
appropriation of energy resources. An agreement is
reached for resource distribution, which includes the
commercial sector. Astronauts are granted diplomatic
immunity. Nations begin to collaborate on joint efforts
with greater success. By 2028 the first international solar
power satellite (SPS) is launched, generating power to
five countries. Meanwhile, however, water shortage in the
Great Plains of the USA, caused by deterioration of the
Ogalala aquifer, dramatically reduces grain production,
exacerbating disruption in food supply. India and the
USA pursue orbital nuclear power as per multilateral
agreements, to tackle energy demand. Global food shortages
now outstrip humanitarian capacity. In 2030, in an interna-
tional summit, world leaders begin a global rationing of
resources. People connect and coordinate efforts through
telecommunications. Nations begin to discuss the possibility
of establishing a base on Mars, opening up the possibility of
evacuating human populations into space. A coalition of 15
countries agrees to limit orbital nuclear power. The coalition
insists there has to be a collective response on asteroids, and
an international consensus on how to use energy for building
the Mars base. An ICJ Advisory Opinion states that inten-
tionally destructive space objects are prohibited per jus
cogens.4.8. Group observations on Scenario CThe group struggled with defining technological inertia.
They settled on the uncomfortable consensus that for the
purposes of this exercise, ‘‘technological inertia’’ is best
described as ‘‘status quo’’, or the absence of breakthroughs
that redefine the operating landscape. In this scenario, it is still
prohibitively expensive to get into space, and the pace of
discovery is slow.
Legal tools promote solutions, but ultimately, it all comes
down to political will. What is needed are institutions to
reduce the likelihood of conflict on Earth, and international
legal agreements. In this scenario, it is the internationally
cooperative nature of space activity that diminishes the like-
lihood of weapons in space being used against adversaries on
Earth.
The crucial assumption in this scenario is that, despite all
these global catastrophes, there still seem to be sufficient
resources to make it into space.nable: Scenarios on the future of space, Space Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/
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Fig. 2. Summary of the implications of the three scenarios.
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ARTICLE IN PRESS4.9. Implications40 The assertion that expanding international commercial links dampens the
likelihood of conflict is, of course, contested within international relations
scholarship. For principal viewpoints on this question, see Robert O. Keohane
and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition
(Glenview, Il: Scott, Foresman, 1989); Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the
Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (Basic Books,
1986); and Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘‘Structural Causes and Economic Effects,’’
chapter 7 of Theory of International Politics (McGraw-Hill, 1979).
41 Brand Steward, City Planet, Global Business Network, 2005 http://gbn.
com/articles/pdfs/City-Planet_StewartBrand.pdf, accessed 18 November 2009.A summary of the implications of the three scenarios is
presented in Fig. 2.
Participants noted that in none of the scenarios does technology
solve anything in and of itself. Less surprising was that the quality
of diplomatic relations on Earth drove conflict, and sowas a key to
solving conflict. Participants also realized that, where the scenarios
were Sino-US focused, they had often projected forward lessons of
the history of bipolar Cold War, uncovering an assumption that
a Chinese superpower would behave similarly to the Soviets. This
assumption may not be wrong, but it is far from certain.
The scenarios showed that, as more nation-states develop
an interest in expanding their footprint into space, conflict in
space will increasingly affect neutral third parties. Just as with
nuclear deterrence relations, conflict among a few parties can
prove catastrophic for all. As a small-scale example, the 2007
Chinese ASAT significantly increased appreciation for the
effect of space debris. A crucial recommendation therefore is
to strengthen existing international agreements as a basis for
dialogue, including military-to-military confidence building.
Such a strategy would require identifying common interests
and challenges and fostering international cooperation through
joint ventures and the sharing of technology.
The private sector is crucial to technological progress and
the development of less costly ventures into space. In all three
scenarios, governments took advantage of private sector
innovation, but nationalized vital space and satellite tech-
nology industries in order to advance perceived national
interests. This had a strangling effect on innovative entrepre-
neurial ventures. Business requires a stable and secure envi-
ronment to thrive, which argues for international conventions
if only to regulate as well as protect commercial transactions.
The challenge is that space is one particular area where
ideologicaledoctrinal ideas seem to govern space law, rein-
forcing the need to cultivate a vision of humanity’s future in
space beyond purposes of national defense. In essence, the
commercialization of space was seen as having great potentialPlease cite this article in press as: Wade L Huntley et al., Planning the unplan
j.spacepol.2009.11.007to mitigate conflict on Earth, much in the same way that
business links between nations can deepen interdependence,
thus raising the stakes for out-and-out warfare.40
Participants realized that they did not fully think through the
effect of the globalization of information and technology in their
scenarios. Recent assessments challenge the assumption that
globalization will continue according to present trends, partic-
ularly that it will disproportionately benefit the developed
world.41 The global rise of connective technologies, and
decreasing cost of technology, may level the playing field in
unexpected ways. It certainly may mean new dialogue partners
from themiddle powers or even developing regions of theworld.
In the plenary, participants noted that in all the scenarios
there is an assumption of the importance of the state system.
But the state is not necessarily the actor that will drive the
weaponization of space. Globalization could enable a non-
state actor to obtain capabilities to attack satellites or conduct
espionage. A ‘‘rogue’’ actor could be a state or someone
associated with the state (keeping that state responsible), but
could also be a non-state actor. At the same time, the prolif-
eration and globalization of information and ideas encourages
the involvement of civil society (Generation Y in ‘‘Back to the
Future’’; humanitarian organizations in ‘‘Pax Necessitas’’) in
powerful ways.
Participants noted that if there is only vague interest in the
rule of law, there is also only vague commitment to enforce.
The difficulty of enforcement in the international arena (small
and weak countries can be checked and punished by larger
powers, but not vice versa) reinforces how enforcement
strategies are hamstrung in the absence of mutual interest.
Commitments to principle need to be girded by actors having
a vested interest in the legal system itself. But gaining buy-in
to a system of norms, laws and regimes will involve factors
from outside that system. There is a synergistic, ‘‘chicken/
egg’’ relationship between formulating laws and regimes and
adherence to the rule of law.
This also presents an important opportunity. The empow-
erment of civil society, a driver of humanitarian values and
concerns, could be a key to sustaining the peaceful use of
space. Particularly where resource scarcity is a potential driver
for international conflict, engagement of civil society may be
a mitigating force. This would, however, require decreasing
the current knowledge gap between space experts and civil
society. Large ambitious projects such as reaching Mars do not
hold much appeal for a society increasingly concerned with
the cost of energy and global humanitarian and environmental
crises.nable: Scenarios on the future of space, Space Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/
42 Adam Kahane, Tough Problems: An Open Way of Talking, Listening, and
Creating New Realities (San Francisco: BarretteKoehler, 2004).
43 This plot element is most developed in the 1996 film, ‘‘Star Trek: First
Contact.’’ See http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0117731/.
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The results of the space scenarios workshop satisfied the
conveners’ goals of generating insights into how disparate key
variables might interact in shaping long-term space futures,
and in demonstrating the utility of scenario-building exercises
in stimulating these insights. There was no attempt in the
workshop to generate specific policy-relevant conclusions.
Instead, the scenarios were generated, and are presented here,
with the aim of stimulating thinking about such applications
among a broader audience.
The conveners also anticipated the limitations of the scale
of the exercise relative to the enormity of the focal question.
For this reason, the workshop concluded with an evaluation of
the process participants had just experienced, and a discussion
of the opportunities and obstacles of potential future applica-
tions. Some of the following observations draw from that
discussion.
As anticipated, one important merit of the process was that
it generated constructive dialogue around complex issues.
Common themes emerged even though participants came from
diverse professional backgrounds. Thus there was a strong
desire to continue the dialogue generated by the workshop,
both to adjust for ongoing events and to examine some of the
findings in more depth. Areas of potentially deeper analysis
include specific turning points (such as those where conflict
emerged), the implications of increasing the commercializa-
tion of space, and a breakdown of the involvement and
interests of the various actors (states, institutions, non-state
actors). The goal would be to project common elements likely
to be in a family of international instruments cutting across
public, private and communal sectors, or to identify codes of
conduct.
Workshop participants did note that most were from North
America, and that different sets of assumptions and conclu-
sions may have emerged if the process was held with Chinese,
Indian or European participants. This observation reinforced
the conveners’ pre-existing judgment: because successful
scenario building depends upon the ‘‘friction’’ of diverse
knowledge and outlooks, international participation would be
vital to the success of more extensive exercises. Moreover,
scenario analysis can also be an ideal vehicle for broaching
sensitive topics in an international dialogue. Because the
process is designed to identify shared critical uncertainties and
focus on longer-term challenges, it is ideally suited to provide
a forum wherein participants divided by contentious near-term
issues can find a common basis for engagement. Thus,
scenario-building exercises can yield community-building
benefits independent of their substantive results.
In this vein, the process can also help generate ‘‘buy-in’’
among divided parties with very different interests to the
minimal objective of identifying a shared set of long-term
future concerns (as the Mont Fleur experience shows). It is not
necessary for participants to possess, at the outset, common
core values. It is sufficient that there be agreement on common
process values within the exercise, the most important being
commitment to the goals of the exercise and a willingness toPlease cite this article in press as: Wade L Huntley et al., Planning the unplan
j.spacepol.2009.11.007think about matters imaginatively. Participants do not need to
leave their opinions at the door e indeed, the ‘‘friction’’ of that
diverse input is vital to the success of the process. They need
only be ready and able also to view things from others’ points
of view.
Achieving that atmosphere also depends in part on the
design and facilitation of the exercises. Particularly when
incorporating international participation, it is essential to
account for asymmetry of power among the participants. The
success of the Mont Fleur process resulted, in part, because no
authority had the power to enforce solutions.42 That is not the
case in the space domain insofar as the USA and other key
actors do have disproportionate power, at least in the short run.
Another challenge in garnering greater international
participation is the scope of the exercises themselves. Typi-
cally, scenario building and analysis involves a group of 20-30
people, a limit allowing for full participation. A single
scenario-building exercise including representatives of all
stakeholders both internationally and with respect to issue
areas (security, commerce, etc.) would be ungainly in size.
Useful results will require a design involving an iterated set of
differentiated exercises.
Scenario analysis is a promising approach for developing
visions of the future of space that can help build global
consensus around values and contribute to more far-sighted
government policy making. As noted earlier, the use of
scenario analysis as a tool in international public policy
making on issues of war and peace is nascent. But its utility
with respect to the many issues enveloping the expanding
human presence in space is particularly appropriate, both
because of the high levels of uncertainty in two discrete
dimensions (technological and sociological/political) and
because the human emergence into space expresses the most
visionary side of the human experience.
Many space enthusiasts today were weaned on the science
fiction of the Star Trek television and movie franchise. Those
familiar with the Star Trek universe know that behind its
entertainment devices lies a vision of the future, several centu-
ries hence, in which Earth is prosperous and peaceful, and
humanity has joined a ‘‘federation’’ with other extraterrestrial
sentient beings dedicated to benevolent interstellar exploration.
Of course, galactic conflict still exists (the original series self-
consciously overlaid Cold War political dynamics in its repre-
sentations). Nevertheless, humanity was deemed to have pro-
gressed beyond potential collective self-destruction.
A closer examination of this vision, however, reveals
a telling turn in the storyline: all this progress, both techno-
logical and social, originated with extraterrestrial contact.43
That contact had both benevolent and malicious long-term
implications; but above all the discovery of an interstellar
‘‘them’’ provided the foundation for the unifying conceptual-
ization of a worldwide ‘‘us’’ to become the driving force ofnable: Scenarios on the future of space, Space Policy (2009), doi:10.1016/
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history is rife with examples of communities coalescing into
larger entities precisely to fruitfully engage e or find protec-
tion from e other newly encountered communities.
Here is where the Star Trek vision fails us. We cannot
depend upon the equivalent of a propitious Vulcan visitation to
inspire us to discover the commonalities requisite to peaceful
expansion of the human presence in space. Our destiny lies not
in our stars, but in ourselves.Acknowledgements
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